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ABSTRACT 
The Hamartia of Aristotle 
Albert A. Sackey1 
The term hamartia, as it appears in Aristotle s Poetics, has baffled critics. 
Two schools of thought have dichotomized the meaning of the word. 
While the first attempts to explain it in terms of moral evil and proposes 
tragic sziffering as the retributive consequence of a "tragic flaw" in the 
individual's character, the second rejects this moral interpretation but 
is unable to find a suitable interpretation or explanation for the word. 
The moral schools interpretation of hamartia is based on a perceived 
direct link between tragic character and tragic purpose, with tragic 
action being assigned a subordinate status. However, a careful scrutiny 
of the Poetics reveals that tragic flaw or moral weakness is not one of 
the requirements of tragedy and that a hero's misfortune is due, not to 
his nature, but to the wrong he has committed, either through ignorance 
or out of duty. Moreover, to Aristotle the requisite for consideration is 
positive, not negative character traits as in a tragic flaw, and tragic acts 
are committed not in character but out of character. A tragic hero, by his 
hamartia, brings a dislocation in the natural order. When he is punished, 
the disruption is removed and harmony is restored to the universe. 
One passage which has baffled critics in the reading of Aristotle's Poetics 
and has led to a great deal of misconception of the source of the tragic 
situation as understood by Aristotle, appears in the Poetics where Aristotle 
defines the proper tragic character. In Chapter XIII he states: 
o µem~u apa rnu-rcov A-otITos eon 8i:: rntourns o µri-ri:: ape-rri 
8ta<f>i::pcov Kat OtKatoauvri µri-ri:: Ota aKtav Kat µoX8l]ptav 
µi::-ra~aA.A.cov i::ts •riv 8ua-ruXtav aA.A.a 8t aµapnav nva 
-rcov i::v µi::yaA-ri Oo~l] ov-rcov Kat eu-ruXta otov Ot8tl1ous Kat 
8UeO"Tl]S Kat Ot f:K TCOV 'tOlOUTCilV f:VCOV eilt<f>avetS avOpeS 
There remains then the man who occupies the mean 
between saintliness and depravity. He is not extraordinary 
in virtue and righteousness, and yet does not fall into bad 
t· Albert A. Sackey is Associate Professor of Literature in the Department of English, University of Ghana, Legon. 
Legon Journal of the HUMANITIES I 77 
Albert A. Sackey Volume 21 (2010) 
fortune because of evil and wickedness, but because of 
some hamartia of the kind found in men of high reputation 
and good fortune, such as Oedipus and Thyestes and 
famous men of similar families. (Aristotle, the Poetics, 
1453a. 7-12.) 
The word "hamartia" appears for the first time in Aristotle's definition 
of tragedy in the extract quoted above. According to Brian Vickers, two 
schools of thought have dichotomized the meaning of the word. The first 
school attempts to explain the word in terms of moral evil and proposes 
tragic suffering as the retributive consequence of a "tragic flaw" in the 
individual's character; the second school rejects this moral interpretation 
but is unable to find a suitable interpretation or explanation for the word. 
It would appear the moral school was begun by the 10111 Century Arab 
physician/philosopher Avicenna in his commentary on the Poetics where 
he uses the Arabic word zalal, meaning "error'', to translate hamartia. 
According to Avicenna, this error implies a "straying from the path 
of duty and losing sight of what is more noble" (Avicenna, The Cure). 
To Avicenna, tragedy teaches us the right thing to do in our given 
circumstances, that is, the proper conduct in society. Avicenna, therefore, 
in his equation of the emotional and ethical effects of tragedy, became the 
first critic to attribute moral relevance to the tragic hamartia. 
In the 161h Century, after the rediscovery of the Poetics, the moral school 
began to gain more ground. Most of the major Italian Renaissance critics, 
in their commentaries on the newly discovered Poetics, agreed with 
Avicenna that Aristotle had a moral concept in mind when he introduced 
the tragic hamartia in his definition of the tragic character. Four critics 
immediately come to mind in this context: Antonio Minturno, Lodovico 
Castelvetro, Giraldi Cinthia and Torquato Tasso. In his dialogic discussion 
of the tragic hero in Book II of his L'arte poetica, Minturno suggests 
that tragic heroes like Oedipus, Thyestes and Creon are unhappy "more 
through human error than through deliberate wickedness" (emphasis 
mine).1 Similarly, Castelvetro, in his commentary on the tragic situation 
of pity and fear, argues that tragic characters, "through error of mind, 
act horribly when they believe they are acting fitly" (emphasis mine).2 
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Minturno and Castelvetro here perceive the tragic circumstance in terms 
of human weakness. In parallel translations Cinthio and Tasso render 
hamartia as "error", linking it to a moral incapacity, however benign, on 
the part of the tragic hero. 3 
These sixteenth century commentators on Aristotle spoke with authority 
and conviction and their moral thesis set the stage for the great error of the 
next three hundred years. Indeed, no subsequent study of the Poetics was 
spared the moral impetus of their debate and they influenced almost every 
writer and critic after them, including Hegel who almost two centuries later 
actually introduced the phrase "tragic flaw" as a translation of hamartia.4 
A.C. Bradley, the great Shakespearean scholar of the last century and an 
ardent disciple of Hegel, took up the mantle of the moral school, and in his 
monumental study of the psychological inwardness of the Shakespearean 
tragic character, did more than any other critic to advance the concept of 
tragic flaw as an essential ingredient of the tragic character. 5 But Hegel 
and Bradley are not experts in critical discourse, and their understanding 
of hamartia is primarily in relation to their discussions of drama generally. 
For specialized scholarship on the hamartia of Aristotle we must turn 
to three Aristotelian critics of the 201h century: S.H. Butcher and Lane 
Cooper (two of the chief exponents of the moral school) and Gerald Else, 
the most authoritative critic of the second school.6 Butcher, in The Poetics 
of Aristotle (1920), calls hamartia "some error or frailty'', as he wavers 
between "error" and "frailty." Lane Cooper (1947) translates hamartia 
as "some error of judgment or shortcoming." In a long commentary on 
his conception of hamartia as "moral flaw", Cooper first argues that the 
etymology of the word makes it possible to apply it to both the inner and 
outward faults of man. But as Else rightly points out, such semasiological 
investigations of the word have been carried out in the past,7 and none of 
the studies has revealed the word's true meaning. Else reminds us that 
the Poetics was written in the fourth century B.C., when "aµapwveiv, 
aµapna, and their cognates and compounds display such a wide range of 
meanings-all the way from simple error or failure to 'sin' or as close to 
it as a classical Greek ever comes" (379). 
Three cognates of the Greek word hamartia appear in the Poetics: 
aµapwvro, aµapna and aµapniµa. Liddell and Scott's Greek-English 
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Lexicon gives the meanings of all three words. The verb aµapmvro (from 
which the infinitive, aµapmvi>tv, is derived) is translated as "to miss, miss 
the mark, ... to fail of doing, fail of one's purpose, go wrong; to be deprived 
of a thing, lose it, to fail, do wrong, error, sin" (38). The same lexicon gives 
the meaning ofboth aµap-rriµa and aµapna as "a failure, error, sin" (ibid). 
The word aµapmvi>tv is first used in the Poetics in Chapter 8, 1451a.20. 
Cooper translates it as "faulty choice" (30), Butcher as "error" (33) and 
Else as "wrong" (296). When the same word appears in Chapter 13, 
l453a.24, Cooper has "error" (42), Butcher, "error" (47), and Else, "error" 
(399). In Chapter 15, 1454b.17, it becomes for Cooper "mistakes" (51), 
for Butcher, "error" (57) and for Else, "wrong". In Chapter 19, 1456b.15, 
Cooper gives the meaning as "fault" (64), Butcher as "fault" (71) and 
Else passes over the chapter entirely. Finally, in Chapter 25, 1460b.23, 
Cooper translates "fault", Butcher, "error", and again Else passes over 
the chapter. The cognate hamartema appears four times in the Poetics: 
first, in Chapter 5, 1449a.34, where Cooper renders it as "shortcoming 
and deformity" (14), Butcher as "some defect or ugliness" (21) and Else as 
"mistake or piece of ugliness"; then thrice in Chapter 25, 1460b.19 and 30, 
and 146lb.8. In 1469b.19, Cooper has "mistake" (84), in 1460b. 30 he has 
"error" (85) and in 146lb.8, '.'mistake" (89). Butcher has "error" (99) and 
"mistake" (105), respectively; again, Else has no commentary on Chapter 
25. 
Aristotle uses tht; controversial word hamartia itself five times in the 
Poetics. Apart from Chapter 13 where it comes up twice, it occurs once 
in Chapter 16 and twice in Chapter 25. In Chapter 16, 1454b.35, Cooper 
translates it as "fault" (53), Butcher as "fault" (59) and Else omits the 
Chapter entirely. In Chapter 25, 1460b.15 and 17, Cooper renders the word 
as "errors" and "fault" (84), Butcher respectively as "faults" and "error" 
(99)8 and Else does not discuss the chapter. In Chapter 13, hamartia·is first 
contrasted with kakia in 1453a.10, then with mochtheria in 1455a.16. In 
1453a.10, Cooper translates it as "some error of judgment or shortcoming" 
and Butcher as "some error or frailty", while Else has "some mistake". In 
1453a.16, for hamartian mega/en Cooper has "a serious defect in judgment 
or shortcoming in conduct", Butcher has "some great error or frailty" and 
Else "a big mistake". A careful look at the interpretations of hamartia 
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given by Cooper and Butcher reveals an interesting discrimination in 
their translations. For the verb hamartano, on three occasions Cooper 
translates it as "fault," as "error" on one occasion, and as "mistake" on 
another. Butcher has "error" on four occasions and "fault" on one. It is 
difficult to justify these shifts in rendition of the same word. Cooper is 
particularly guilty of this arbitrariness. 
Cooper's commentary on hamartia goes beyond etymology and semantics 
and wades into thematics. In a long discussion of the tragic character, he 
contends that most tragic heroes suffer from a general fl.aw which he calls 
a "blindness of heart": 
Under this general fl.aw may be gathered the specific flaws 
of various heroes, for example: 'the wrath of Achilles' in 
the Iliad; the overweening curiosity and presumption of 
Odysseus in the encounter with the Cyclops; 'Man's first 
disobedience' in Paradise Lost; the jealousy of Othello; 
the ambition of Macbeth; the rashness of Lear. It is this 
fl.aw in the inward eye which mars the vision of agents 
whose penetration otherwise is keen, such as Oedipus and 
Hamlet, making their outward activity at critical junctures 
sometimes too slow and sometimes too hasty (40-1). 
Cooper is here guilty of two faults. He confounds the plot and character 
of tragedy and epic, which Aristotle sees as distinct genres with 
distinct features and characteristics. Secondly, Cooper's identification 
of Milton's and Shakespeare's heroes with characters of Greek tragedy 
is fl.awed. The characters of Milton and Shakespeare are consciously 
. conceived within the framework of Christian ethics. They are based on 
the Christian doctrine of unity of character and being which postulates 
that the character cannot be separated from the action, that action and 
character are complementary. This is opposed to the Pre-Christian pagan 
ethical concept of morality, what Potts calls "the pagan morality of doing 
rather than being" (11), which is at the backgro1:md of Aristotle's persistent 
insistence in the Poetics on the separation of character and action. 
The moral school of Aristotelian critical discourse intimates a direct 
link between tragic character and tragic purpose and sidelines tragic 
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action to subordination. But a careful scrutiny of the Poetics abundantly 
demonstrates otherwise and affirms the centrality of plot in the tragic 
enterprise. I list below excerpts from the Poetics on the relative importance 
of action in carrying out the objectives of tragedy. All quotations are 
from the translation of Allan H. Gilbert.9 The following extracts are from 
chapter 6: 
Tragedy then is the imitation of an action (1449b.24). 
The most important of these is the putting together of the 
separate actions, for tragedy is an imitation not of men but 
of actions and life (1450a.15-16). 
And happiness and unhappiness reside in action, and the 
end is some sort of action, not a quality, for according to 
their characters men are what they are, but according to 
their actions they are happy or the reverse (1450a. 17-19). 
They do not, then, act in order to represent character, 
but in the course of their actions they show what their 
characters are (1450a.20). 
So in the actions and the plot is found the end of tragedy, 
and the end is more important than anything else 
(1540a.21). 
Without action there can be no tragedy, but without 
characters there can be one (1450a.22). 
The soul of tragedy is the plot; the characters are in the 
second place (1450a.37-38). 
The plot is an imitation of an action and presents char 
acters primarily for the sake of what they do (1450b.3-4). 
The necessity of plot in the attainment of the tragic end is reiterated in 
other chapters: Chapter 7, 1450b.21; Chapter 9, 1451b.19; Chapter 11, 
1452a.29; Chapter 14, 1453b.1; Chapter 15, 1454a. 16; Chapter 17, 1455a.34; 
and Chapter 18, 1455b.24. 
If plot rather than character is the propelling engine of tragedy, and 
Aristotle has ruled strongly on the matter in his Poetics, what then may 
explain the stubborn obsession with the character and his tragic flaw as 
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the source of the tragic hamartia? Perhaps the Italian Renaissance critics, 
the initiators of the tragic flaw theory, may provide the answer. When 
the Poetics was first discovered in the Renaissance, Italian critics were 
the first commentators to actually see the original text and to have the 
opportunity to pass judgment. Italian commentaries on the Poetics were 
widely publicized long before the Greek text became generally available, 
and most European scholars first read the treatise second hand in Italian 
translations. Inevitably, these early Italian readings (or misreadings) of 
Aristotle influenced later readings of the text. A concept like the unity 
of place, with no Aristotelian sanction, came to be ascribed to the master 
by Castelvetro and his contemporaries.10 The same critics began the 
"characterization" of hamartia where the tragic hero is burdened with a 
tragic weakness. 
The early Italians then were responsible for propagating the moral 
school, and to appreciate why these early critics and their followers, 
notwithstanding Aristotle's own statements to the contrary, insisted on 
reading the tragic hamartia as an inherent character trait, we must examine 
the dichotomy between the classical psyche steeped in a pagan morality 
and the Christian mind with its belief in Original Sin. To the pagan mind 
a man's actions are not necessarily determined by his character but most 
often by forces beyond his control; hence a good man is capable of evil 
action. The ancients separated a man's character from his actions, with 
the latter rather than the former usually being the cause of his good or bad 
fortune. Christian morality is the opposite. Because of the notion of original 
sin, no man is without blemish of character. Therefore, when the Christian 
Renaissance came to translate the pagan Classics, the Christian sensibility 
was perplexed by the apparent amorality of the pagan message. How can 
innocent persons be punished for unpremeditated crimes? Why should a 
good man suffer for acts committed not through evil or wickedness? In 
the face of this apparent absence of a moral code of conduct, the Christian 
critics of the Renaissance, in their interpretation of the pagan stories, 
ardently searched for moral defects of character to explain the heroes' 
fall from grace. A good example is Castelvetro's discussion in his Poetics 
Chapter IX, 223-226 of the tragic events in Aeschylus' Agamemnon and 
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Euripides' Hippolytus and Medea, where the Italian critic imposes tragic 
flaws on the three female characters to justify their fall. 
The point can now be forcefully made that any reading of hamartia 
which links it to character has no basis in Aristotle or Greek tragedy, and 
perhaps for a proper appreciation of why post-classical criticism places 
such moral emphasis on the tragic situation we may turn to the Christian 
lexicon, Anno Domini. In the Greek Bible, the word hamartia underwent a 
metamorphosis of meaning distinct from its classical usage. Throughout 
the New Testament the word is used to describe "sin". 1 John 3: 9-10, our 
most illustrative text on New Testament understanding ofhamartia, reads 
in the Greek: 
IIas 0 yc:yEVVTjµEVOS EK TOU ernu aµapnav Ou ITOlEl, on 
aIIEpµa auwu EV UUTffi µEV El Km OU ouvmm aµapTaV D lV, 
on EK LOU ernu YEYEVVTJTUl. 
Hamartia appears as both noun (hamartia) and verb (hamartano) in the 
extract above to denote human frailty. We may literally translate the 
Greek: 
Anyone born of God cannot commit hamartia because 
the seed of God remains in him, and therefore he cannot 
harmatanein since he is born of God. 
The key to the meaning of hamartia here hinges on two pivotal 
assumptions: 
The seed of God is present in anyone born of God. 
God is perfect and divine and a person with God's seed 
implanted in him is unable to commit hamartia, even if he 
so desires, since it is not in his nature to commit hamartia. 
Evidently, the meaning of hamartia here is related to the doctrine of 
sin, and throughout the Greek Testament hamartia translates as sin, a 
moral flaw in the human behaviour interlinked with character. This new 
understanding of hamartia acktl.owledged by the Christian Renaissance 
was unknown to the ancients who dichotomized action and being. 
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In its historical context from Homer to Aristotle, a period spanning some 
five hundred years [850BC to 322BC], there was very little change in the 
use of the word hamartia in the Greek literary script. From the Old Ionic 
dialect of Homer, through the New Ionic of Thucydides, to the Attic dialect 
of Plato, Aristotle's contemporary, the meaning of hamartia was often 
associated with an external activity rather than with an inherent weakness 
of character. The word hamartia itself is rare in ancient literature, but its 
cognates and compounds, such as hamartano, hamartema, hamartole and 
examartano, abound in the literary tradition of ancient Greece. In Homer, 
especially in the Iliad, the verb hamartano is used several times during 
battle to describe the hurling of missiles at an enemy and the failure to 
hit the target, as in the Iliad, VIII: 309-11; X: 372; and XI, 232-5, in all 
of which instances the word is used to describe the failure of a thrown 
missile to hit its target in warfare, hence the absence of accurate aim. In 
Homer, then, hamartia and its cognates mean "missing the mark". 
In Thucydides, the word hamartia is used at least once, but the variants 
hamartano and hamartema appear a number of times, usually in contrast 
with the verb adikeo and its substantive adikema. In the History of 
the Peloponnesian War, 1: XXI, 1, Thucydides uses hamartanoi to 
describe an error of opinion, and in 1: XXXIII, 3, the expression gnomes 
hamartanei means error in judgment. Again, in 1: XXXVIII, 5 - XLII, 2, 
hamartano is on three occasions differentially set against adikeo, which 
connotes injury and injustice. In 1: XXXVIII, 5, adikoumenoi delineates 
the moral wrongness of waging an unusual war against the enemy whilst 
hamartanomen suggests that such a morally wrong war may be an error or 
miscalculation. In 1: XXXIX, 3, edikemetha conveys the injustice of the 
enemy's assault, and hamartematon expresses the tactical blunders of the 
enemy in battle. Finally, in 1: XLII, 2, the expression elachista hamartane 
means an error of action, as opposed to the expression keleuousin adikein 
which denotes instigation to evil. In 1: XXII, 5, in a passage unique for 
its semblance to Aristotle's diction in his definition of the tragic hero, 
Thucydides juxtaposes hamartia with kakia, a word which connotes 
evil and wickedness. From these we may observe that in Thucydides, 
hamartia means error or a failed purpose, signification more significantly 
subjective than its earlier Homeric sense. 
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Plato was a contemporary, indeed the teacher of Aristotle, and his 
understanding of hamartia is similar to Aristotle's. In Plato's dialogues, 
the word hamartia and its cognates largely echo the meaning in 
Thucydides, who was his contemporary but not Aristotle's. Let us take 
a few examples. In the Apology, 22D, Socrates equates hamartema with 
vanity of knowledge which he perceives, not as a weakness of disposition, 
but as a general failing associated with certain professions whose 
special expertise sometimes leads to a false profession of proficiency 
in unrelated fields. In the Crito, 53A, Socrates explains examartano in 
terms of breaking the law by escaping from lawful custody; and in the 
Phaedrus, 263A, Socrates again uses the verb hamartano to describe a 
faulty statement which lacks art. In the Phaedo, 113D-114A, Socrates 
gives four instances of acts of hamartema: grave deeds of sacrilege such 
as hierosylia (desecrating or stealing from consecrated grounds); wicked 
and abominable murders; acts of outrage or violence against a parent in a 
moment of passion, which one regrets afterwards; and acts of murder in a 
moment of passion, also regretted afterwards. 
We observe from the four examples above that Socrates, in the Phaedo, 
establishes two types of hamartia: the deed done deliberately [the first two 
instances] and the deed done unwittingly [the remaining two examples]. 
Aristotle makes similar observations about the tragic situation. In the 
Poetics, Chapter XIV, 1453b, 1-50, Aristotle observes that a good tragedy 
involves family members or people with mutual affection for each other 
and prescribes four situations of tragedy, "besides which there is no other": 
the deed done by those who know and understand 
the deed not done because the culprit knows and 
understands 
the deed done in ignorance, with knowledge and 
understanding afterwards 
the deed not done because of sudden recognition and 
knowledge. 
In an insightful follow-up commentary on these four situations, Aristotle 
points out that a tragic deed need not be committed for tragedy to be 
effected. In other words, a tragedy need not contain a hamartia and its 
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consequent misfortune and suffering. Indeed, of the four conditions of 
tragedy, Aristotle considers the fourth as the best and "the most tragic", 
where a hamartia is avoided at the very last moment. Aristotle himself cites 
Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris as an example of the best tragedy, where 
just before his sacrifice, Iphigenia recognizes Orestes as her long lost 
brother, and consequently avoids the hamartia of his murder. Bypassing 
the hamartia, however, does not necessarily make a good tragedy. On 
the contrary, Aristotle insists that the second situation is the worst and 
the most 'untragic,' where a hamartia is missed at the very last moment 
by a culprit who all along knows and understands the implications and 
facts of the deed. Such a position merely plays upon our feelings of horror 
by carrying us to the point of tragedy and retreating without any real 
suffering. To Aristotle, this is inexcusable, and the event is not tragic. 
For an example of this kind of tragic situation, Aristotle refers us to the 
end of Sophocles' Antigone, where Haemon, in righteous anger at his 
father's guilt in Antigone's death, draws his sword in the heat of passion 
to strike him but hesitates, and Creon flees as Haemon turns the dagger 
on himself. 11 To Aristotle, Sophocles should not have had Haemon act 
in this way, and the son should either have killed the guilty father or not 
drawn his sword at all. As it turns out, we are suddenly, and with horror, 
confronted with a possible patricide with all its implications, however 
justifiable, but one which does not, for no obvious reasons, materialize. 
From Aristotle's discussion in Chapter XIV, only the first and third 
situations contain hamartia, in the sense that the deed is actually carried 
through under those circumstances, and they are respectively, in the 
view of Aristotle, the third and second most tragic situations after the 
fourth. Indeed, the first and third situations echo Socrates' four examples 
of hamartema in the Phaedo. The first situation, though only the third 
in Aristotle's scale of preference, is the most common among Greek 
tragedians, and is mirrored in Socrates' first two examples in the Phaedo, 
viz. grave deeds of sacrilege, and wicked and abominable murders. 
According to Aristotle, in this situation the deed is deliberately done 
in full knowledge and understanding, and he uses Euripides' Medea 
as illustration where Medea, to spite her husband, kills her sons in full 
knowledge and understanding of her action. 12 As Aristotle points out, this 
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type of tragic situation is the practice of the ancient poets and abounds in 
Greek tragedy: Phaedra's incestuous lust for her stepson and her willful 
plotting of his murder [Euripides' Hippolytus]; Clytemnestra's vicious 
murder of her husband to make way for her adulterous relationship with 
Aegisthus [Aeschylus' Agamemnon]; Orestes' murder of his mother to 
avenge his father's death [Aeschylus' The Choephori]; and many others. 
The third sfruation, the second best according to Aristotle, is where the 
deed is done in ignorance. Socrates' last two examples of hamartema 
in the Phaedo are our nearest equivalent of Aristotle's second most 
tragic situation. In the Phaedo example, even though the hamartema is 
committed in full knowledge, the act is done in the rashness of passion, 
to be regretted later. Here, the tragic deed is done in the blindness of 
the moment which occasions a momentary incapacity to understand and 
appreciate its meaning. The inevitable remorse which follows is therefore 
a movement to gnosis from an initial agonia, as in the case of Aristotle's 
best hamartia which is his second best tragedy. 
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus is Aristotle's SlJpreme model of the best 
hamartia. But there are others. Theseus in Euripides' Hippolytus murders 
his son in full knowledge of his identity, but in the heat of passion and 
in ignorance of his son's innocence. In the end, when Artemis reveals 
the truth to him, he has compunction and begs for forgiveness. In 
Aeschylus' Agamemnon, Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice his daughter 
for the sake of expediency, an action the chorus describe as madness and 
an act of hamartia. He repents too late and suffers the guilt the rest of 
his life. Creon in Sophocles' Antigone undergoes a similar fate when in 
the blindness of ignorance he unwittingly causes the deaths of his son 
and wife. The hamartia of all these characters - Oedipus, Theseus, 
Agamemnon and Creon - cannot be a "flaw in the inward eye'', as Lane 
Cooper insists. 13 Their wrong actions betray a certain blindness, but it 
is not an inward blindness of disposition but a blindness of perception. 
They suffer not from a moral blindness of character but from an external 
incapacity due to ignorance or to the impetuosity of an unguarded 
moment. Such a false step can in no way be described as an inward flaw 
or a moral shortcoming. The temper of Oedipus is not as instrumental 
as agnoia [ignorance] in the commission of his crimes, which include 
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willful acts of impiety. The source of the tragic mathesis in Oedipus 
Tyrannus is not Oedipus' temperamental character but his patricide and 
incest, both committed in agnoia. Oedipus' patricide is more a result of 
his ignorance than his temper, and his marriage to his mother is an act of 
pure ignorance. Besides, these are crimes of the mythical Oedipus which . 
Sophocles skillfully wrote out of his play to make provision for Oedipus' 
acts of impiety which so dominate the play and which form the bedrock 
of the literary Oedipus' tragic hamartia. Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus 
is therefore not a tragedy of character where the hero falls from grace to 
grass because of a tragic fl.aw, but rather a complex tragedy of action in 
which the fall is occasioned by a final anagnorisis, leading to a movement 
from ignorance to knowledge and resulting in the hero's misfortune. 
The same plot structure informs Euripides' Hippolytus. Theseus' 
hamartia is not a character trait but his murder of his son in the blindness 
of his ignorance of the son's true virtue. This much Artemis confirms in 
her last speech, where she exonerates all three tragic characters: Theseus, 
Phaedra and Hippolytus: 
His death was not your will; men may well commit hamartia 
When the gods so ordain.14 
Here, the act of hamartia is generalized to describe the fatal actions of 
all three central characters. Men may commit hamartia when the gods 
so decree. This statement separates the doer from the deed and blames 
external forces, not human depravity, for men's woes. This externalization 
applies to the character and actions of Phaedra, who perceives her 
incestuous desires for her stepson, not as a result of an internal weakness 
of character, but as an external madness brought upon her by her ate. 
Indeed, it is this absence of internalization which marks out Euripides' 
Phaedra from the Phaedra of Seneca and Racine, both of whom trace 
her malady to a tragic fl.aw in the personality. As for the character of 
Hippolytus, the central figure in the play, his absolute lack of moral fl.aw 
or frailty of character is so apparently evident that Jean Racine, working 
under the onus of the moral fl.aw doctrine, is compelled in his version of 
the myth to create the character with a faiblesse- to satisfy his Christian 
perception of character: 
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Pour ce qui est du personnage d'Hippolyte, j'avais 
remarque dans les anciens qu'on reprochait a Euripide de 
l'avoir represente comme un Philosophe exempt de toute 
imperfection; ce qui faisait que la mort de ce jeune Prince 
causait beaucoup plus d'indignation que de pitie. J'ai cru 
lui devoir donner quelque faiblesse qui le rendrait un peu 
coupable envers son pere, sans pourtant lui rien oter de 
cette gradeur d'ame avec. la quelle ii epargne l'honneur 
de Phedre, et se laisse opprimer sans l'accuser [Preface to 
Phedre] 
Like Euripides, the other two major tragedians of ancient Greece, 
Sophocles and Aeschylus, never intended their tragic heroes to fall into 
misfortune because of evil or wickedness caused by an imperfection 
of character. In Aeschylus' Agamemnon, the hamartia of the central 
character is not a fl.awed personality but a wrong choice of action which 
leads to damnation. This is clearly articulated by the chorus of the elders 
of Argos in their opening parodos, where they define the hamartia of 
Agamemnon. In the translation below, the Greek word hamartia has been 
rendered as a reckless wrong: 
Hence that repentance late and long 
Which, since his madness passed, pays toll 
For that one reckless wrong.15 
In Sophocles' Antigone, the hamartia of Creon or Antigone is not what he 
or she is, but what he/she does. Antigone, however good the intention and 
justifiable the deed, acts against human law. A similar hamartia applies 
in the situation of Creon, who acts for human law against divine law. 
These actions are not caused by human failings; they are merely wrong 
acts. Creon's blindness is one of ignorance of the divine law, which leads 
to the death of a blood relation, his son. In the Antigone, in a short space 
of eight lines Sophocles uses the word hamartia thrice [1259, 1261 and 
1269] to describe the crime of Creon, which is the act of killing his own 
son in ignorance. Below is Elizabeth Wyckoff's translation of the scene 
[1257-1269]: 
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[The messenger goes into the house. Creon enters with his 
followers. They are carrying Haemon's body on a bier.] 
Chorus: But look, the king draws near. 
His own hands bring 
the witness of his crime, 
the doom he brought on himself 
Creon: 0 crimes of my wicked heart, 
harshness bringing death. 
You see the killer, you see the kin he killed. 
My planning was all unblest. 
Son, you have died too soon. 
Oh, you have gone away 
through my fault, not your own.16 
[I have italicized the three words which translate hamartia) 
My analyses above are intended to firmly posit that the ancient Greek 
tragedians do not burden their tragic heroes with a weakness of character. 
In this, they are following the best traditions observed by Aristotle. The 
heroes of Sophocles, Euripides and Aeschylus are not conceived in the 
same way Milton, Shakespeare or Racine perceives tragic character. 
We do not talk about the "character" of Oedipus, Agamemnon, Creon, 
Antigone, Theseus, Hippolytus or Phaedra, as we talk of the "character" 
of Milton's Satan, Shakespeare's Hamlet, Lear or Macbeth, or Racine's 
Phedre. In Greek tragedy we are concerned, not with what the characters 
are, but with what they do or do not do, or what happens or does not 
happen to them. In Milton, Shakespeare and most Renaissance and post-
Renaissance Western tragedy, it is the character of the heroes which 
sustains the tragic action; in Greek tragedy, character does not have such 
pivotal force because it is not conceived that way. 
Let us examine the matter further by turning to Aristotle. In the Poetics, 
Chapter XV, Aristotle identifies four necessities of tragic character: He/ 
she must be morally good, appropriate, true to life or to the mythical 
prototypes, and consistent (1454a, 16). Tragic flaw or moral weakness is 
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not one of the requirements, and Aristotle rejects baseness of character 
in tragedy17 and insists that where frailty of character becomes necessary 
because of its presence in the mythical original, the flaw should be played 
down so as not to affect the goodness of the character. 18 Since a hero's 
misfortune is not due to his nature but to the wrong he has done, negative 
traits like anger, cowardice and cruelty should not be allowed to cloud our 
perception of his tragic situation. 
A proper tragic hero then, according to Aristotle, is not morally flawed. 
In moral terms Aristotle places him in a definite context. He must be 
good, though not too virtuous or righteous, but never villainous or evil 
or wicked, and if possible he may not even be tainted with such relatively 
minor negative traits as cowardice, anger and cruelty.19 Such strict criteria 
disqualify the majority of the post-classical so-called tragic heroes of 
Western literature: Satan, Faustus, Richard III, Macbeth, Coriolanus, 
Lear, Hamlet, Othello and a host of others. 
In Chapter VI of the Poetics, Aristotle defines tragedy as "an imitation 
of an action that is serious".20 The indefinite article qualifying the word 
"action" here suggests one single piece of action, hence a single, not a 
double plot, which focuses on the great tragic action of the central or any 
other figure. I quote Aristotle on the unity of action: 
A plot is not unified, as some think, because it is concerned 
with one man, for a countless number of things happen 
to one man, some of which cannot be combined with 
others in a single unit; thus there are many acts by one 
man which cannot form part of a unified action. Therefore 
all the poets who have written Heracleids, Theseids, and . 
similar poems seem to have gone wrong, for they think 
that since Hercules was one man a plot dealing with him 
must also be a unit ... It is necessary then, just as in other 
imitative arts there is one imitation of one thing, that the 
plot, being an imitation of an action, should be concerned 
with one thing ... 21 • 
Aristotle's sentiments here explain why in Greek tragedy a tragic figure 
sometimes appears in several tragedies by the same or different authors, 
92 [ Legan Journal of the HUMANITIES 
Volume 21 (2010) Albert A. Sackey 
and often plays major roles in more than one play. Since tragedy is about 
what a character does rather than what he is, a playwright may write as 
many tragedies on an individual as there are tragic situations in his life. 
The famous trilogies of Sophocles, Aeschylus and Euripides are in this 
tradition, where because of a series of tragic situations revolving around 
a family or its members, several tragedies are composed on the family, 
each play being a complete and separate, autonomous unit. In these 
plays, as Aristotle strongly affirms, the characters "do not act in order 
to represent character, but in the course of their actions they show what 
their characters are". 22 Being human (remember they are neither saints nor 
villains), they are capable of human error, hence their potential for tragic 
action, and we do not blame their misfortune on negative character traits 
but on the wrong they have committed. This is the source of the pity we 
feel for them, and because their suffering is undeserved, it touches our 
philanthropia,23 or human feeling. 
As Aristotle points out, these tragic men and women fall into bad fortune 
not because of evil or wickedness, but because of some hamartia or wrong 
act they have already committed before the play opens, or commit in the 
course of the play. This is how Aristotle puts it in Chapter XIII, 1453a.12: 
The change ... must be from good fortune to bad fortune, 
not because of wickedness but because of some great 
hamartia, either of such a man as has been indicated or of 
a better rather than a worse man. Proof of this is found in 
practice. For at first poets accepted plots as they chanced 
on them, but now the best tragedies are written about a 
few houses as on Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, 
Thyestes Telephus and others on whom it came to suffer 
or do terrible things. 24 
Aristotle would accept for tragic consideration individuals who are better, 
not worse, than these six men ·in character or status. The requisite here 
is positive, not negative character traits as in a tragic flaw. None of the 
six tragic heroes mentioned here is a villain or has a tragic flaw which 
is instrumental in the commission of his hamartia or "terrible thing". 
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Alcmaeon's hamartia is matricide. In a play by the Greek tragedian, 
Astydamas, Eriphyle, the mother of Alcmaeon, for the love of gold kills 
Amphiaraus, her husband, through treachery. Alcmaeon, in revenge, 
kills his mother for his father's murder.25 Oedipus' hamartia is his 
patricide and incest and consequential acts of impiety during the criminal 
investigation, all done in ignorance. Orestes, like Alcmeaon, kills his 
mother, Clytemnestra, in revenge for her murder of her husband, his 
father. 26 Meleager's hamartia is his killing of his mother's two brothers 
who have wronged him. For this crime his mother Althaea kills him 
in revenge and later commits suicide.27 Thyestes commits hamartia by 
eating the cooked flesh of his own son in ignorance in a meal served 
by his treacherous brother, Atreus. Thyestes suffers remorse the rest of 
his life for this error. For this treachery, his son Aegisthus later revenges 
on Atreus' son, Agamemnon.28 I cannot trace the story of Telephus, but 
from the bits and pieces I gather from Homer, the following outline may 
suffice: Mars, the god of war, secretly made love to the faithful Astyoche, 
wife of Telephus, unknown to her, and she brought forth twin sons of the 
god who were mistaken for her husband's. 29 
All these terrible acts are committed not in character but out of character, 
either through ignorance, as in the case of Oedipus, Thyestes and 
Telephus' wife, or as a duty (through revenge), as in the case of Alcmaeon, 
Orestes and Meleager's mother. Anagnorisis then becomes the inevitable 
progression of the tragic circumstance, and the hero, as it were, wakes up 
from the nightmarish experience of his hamartia, and in his recognition 
of the truth of his situation experiences "a change from ignorance to 
knowledge - resulting in love or hate - by those marked out for good 
fortune or bad fortune". 30 Recognition is crucial to the untying of the 
tragic knot. According to Aristotle, "for every tragedy there is a tying 
of the knot, or complication, and an untying of it, or solution. The tying 
is composed of what is without the plot, and many times of some things 
within it; the rest is the untying".31 Aristotle explains further that the 
tying includes every event both outside and inside the play, which adds to 
the complication of the tragic situation up to the point when recognition 
takes place and the change of fortune begins. The untying is the result 
of Recognition and everything else that happens when there is a change 
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from ignorance to knowledge. This follows that the hamartia, whether it 
occurs without or within the plot, is both the genesis and soul of the tying 
whilst Recognition is the genesis and soul of the untying. In other words, 
hamartia creates the complications whilst Recognition brings about the 
solution. Greek tragedy therefore does not present the tragic fall of a hero 
due to an inherent tragic flaw, but rather offers a complication and its 
denouement through the untying of the tragic knot. 
In conclusion, the hamartia of Aristotle is simply a going wrong [not being 
wrong, for that would be an error of character, which is untr~gic], when 
the character is either ignorant of a particular wrong he is committing 
[like Oedipus killing his father and marrying his mother in ignorance], 
or acts in the heat of passion [like Orestes killing his mother to revenge 
his father's death]. Under such circumstances, Greek society prescribes 
appropriate sanctions against the culprit to right the wrong done. A tragic 
hero, by his hamartia, brings a dislocation in the natural order. When 
he is punished, the disruption is removed and harmony is restored to the 
um verse. 
NOTES 
l Antonio Mintumo. L 'arte poetica. Bk. II, 78. Trans. Gilbert, p. 292. 
Lodovico Castelvetro. On the Poetics. Chapter IX, 226, 14. Trans. Gilbert, p. 335. 
See Giraldi Cinthia, Discorsi, 1543, and Torquato Tasso, Disco11rses on the Heroic Poem, B. II, 17. 
Sec Hegel's discussion of tragedy in his The Philosophy of Fine Art. 
Sec for instance Bradley's Shakespearian Tragedy: Lectures on 'Hamlet', 'Othello', 'King Lear·. 'Macbeth·. 
Gerald Else mentions other critics of the moral school such as Harsh, Philips, Pack and Manns. See Grald Else, Aristotle S Poetics: The 
Argument, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1967, p. 379n. 
Else mentions critics like Hey, Phillips and Harsh-all advocates of the "moral flaw" theory-as earlier investigators in the semasiology 
of the word. 
8 Note the way Cooper and Butcher seem to interchange "error" and "fault" for hamartia in Chilpter 25, I460b.15 and 17. 
• 9 Allan H. Gilbert, Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden. 
10 See Castclvctro, 535, 32 where in a clear misreading of Aristotle's Poetics, XXIV, 59b. l7, he writes: "Tragedy .. cannot represent any 
action except such as occurs in one place and within the space of twelve hours .. " 
11 See the Messenger's speech in Sophocles' Antigone, specifically 1231 ff. 
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12 Euripides, Medea, 1236 ff. 
13 Lane Cooper, Aristotle on the Art of Poefly. 
14 Euripides' Jfypp0Zvt11s, 1433-4. Translation is partly by Philip Vcllacott in E11ripides'Three Plays (Penguin, 1970), p.70 
15 Aeschylus' Agamemnon, 222-4. Translation is by Philip Vellacott in Aeschylus: The Oresrelan Trilogy (Penguin, 1965), p.50 
16 David Greene (ed.), Sophocles I (Chicago, University Press, 1954), p.201. 
17 In both Chapkr XV, 1454a.16 and Chapter XXV, 146lb.15 of the Poetics Aristotle refers to the Menelaus of Euripides' Orestes as an 
example of an unnecessary wickedness of character. 
18 In Chapter XV, 1454b.8 (Poetics) Aristotle refers us to Homer's Achilles as an example of hard but good character. 
19 I have here summarised Aristotle's description of the tragic hero as set out in The Poetics, Chapter Xlll, 1453a.7 and Chapter XV, l454b.8. 
20 Aristotle, The Poetics, Chapter VI, t 449b.20. Translated by Allan Gilbert, pp. 75-6. 
21 The Poetics, Chapter VJIJ, 1451a.l6. Quoted from Gilbert, pp. 80-1. 
22 The Poeiics, Chapter VI, 1450a.15; ibid, p.77. 
23 The Poetics, Chapter XJIJ, 1452b.28. 
24 Quoted from Gilbert, p.86. 
25 My sources for the.story of this play, which is now lost, are The Poetics, Chapter xrv, 1453b.I-26; and Homer, The Odyssey, XI, 326-7. 
26 Aristotle compares the matricides of Orestes and Alcmacon in The Poetics, ChapterXN, 1453b.24-25. 
27 Vii.le Ovid, Metamorphoses, Bk VIII, 260-530. 
28 Vidc Aegisthus' speech in Aeschylus' Agamemnon, 1578-1612. 
29 Homer, lliadBk II, 511-15; Homer, Odyssey, Bk XI, 516-21. 
30 The Poetics, Chapter XI, 1452a.29. Quoted from Gilbert, p.84. 
31 The Poetics, Chapter XVIII, l455b.24. Quote~ from Gilbert, pp. 95-6. 
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